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Catharine Cockburn on Unthinking Immaterial Substance:  
Souls, Space, and Related Matters 
 
 
The early modern Catharine Cockburn wrote on a wide range of philosophical issues, and recent 
years have seen an increasing interest in her work. This paper explores her thesis that immaterial 
substance need not think. Drawing on existing scholarship, I explore the origin of this thesis in 
Cockburn, and show how she applies it in a novel way to space. This thesis provides a particularly useful 
entry point into Cockburn’s philosophy, as it emphasises the importance of her metaphysics and connects 
with many of her further philosophical views. This paper shows that it is rewarding to consider 
Cockburn’s philosophical views as a holistic system.    
 
1 Introduction 
The early eighteenth century thinker Catharine Cockburn (1679-1749) is best known as a 
playwright but, over the last twenty years, her philosophical tracts have gained recognition and 
attention1. This paper will discuss a core part of Cockburn’s metaphysics, her thesis that 
immaterial substance need not think. In holding this view, Cockburn is agreeing with John 
Locke, and disagreeing with Descartes. Drawing in part on existing literature, the first half of the 
paper will explore the origins of this thesis in Cockburn, and the second half will show how she 
applies it in a novel way to space. This thesis provides a particularly useful entry point into 
Cockburn’s work for two reasons. First, it emphasises Cockburn’s metaphysics, a part of her 
philosophy that is relatively understudied. Second, this thesis is connected to many of 
Cockburn’s additional philosophical views, including her Lockean view of personal identity, 
feminism, moral philosophy, and Platonism. As it goes along, this paper will note these 
connections and provide links to the relevant scholarship, giving readers a wider sense of 
Cockburn’s corpus.    
The paper will proceed as follows. Section 2 explores the origins of Cockburn’s thesis 
that immaterial substance need not think. Prior to Cockburn, this thesis was advanced in Locke’s 
Essay. It was attacked soon after publication by Thomas Burnet, and Cockburn defends the 
thesis on Locke’s behalf. This discussion reveals that Cockburn is at least partly motivated to 
hold the thesis as a result of her Lockean scepticism about substance. Cockburn’s belief that 
immaterial substance need not think is not novel. However, as Section 3 argues, Cockburn goes 
on to apply the thesis in a wholly novel way: to produce a new conception of space as an 
immaterial, unintelligent substance. Section 4 offers some final thoughts.  
 
                                                 
1
 For biographies of Cockburn (nee Trotter) and wide overviews of her work, see Waithe (1991), Bolton (1993), 
Nuovo (2000), Kelley (2002), Broad (2002, 141-165), and Sheridan (2011). On Cockburn as a playwright, see 
Morgan (1989).  
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2 Why Immaterial Substance Need Not Think 
2.1 Locke on immaterial substance and his critics   
Cockburn discusses the thesis that immaterial substance need not think in the context of 
defending Locke. This section will briefly lay out the two parts of Locke’s work that are pertinent 
to this defence, and detail an early critique of them.   
The first is Locke’s account of personal identity. Locke’s “Of Identity and Diversity”, 
was first published in 1694 as part of the second edition of An Essay concerning Human 
Understanding. Locke asks, What makes a person the same person over time? His famous answer 
runs as follows. ‘[A person] is a thinking intelligent Being, that has reason and reflection, and can 
consider it self as it self, the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it does only 
by that consciousness, which is inseparable from thinking... in this alone consists personal Identity’ 
(II.xxvii.9). For Locke, to be the same person over time is to have the same consciousness. 
Locke distinguishes this notion of a ‘person’ from the notion of a ‘man’, a material human 
organism (II.xxviii.15); and the notion of a ‘soul’, an immaterial substance (II.xxviii.12). This 
brings us on to the second part of Locke’s work that is of interest to us: his account of 
immaterial substance. Understanding it requires a little background.  
In the early modern period, prominent thinkers such as Descartes claimed to understand 
the nature of substance. Descartes’ Principles of Philosophy argues that there are two kinds of 
created substance: material and immaterial. Descartes claims that we can ‘easily come to know’ a 
substance through its attribute, the principal property that constitutes its nature and essence: 
‘extension in length, breadth and depth’ constitutes the nature of material substance; and 
‘thought’ constitutes the nature of immaterial substance (I:52-3). 
Against philosophers such as Descartes, Locke denies that we can easily know substance. 
Locke accepts that some subject must support collections of qualities - such as colours or smells 
- and for this reason he allows that substances exist. However, he argues that our idea of 
substance is obscure, describing it as ‘I know not what’2 (II.xxiii.2-3). Locke’s general scepticism 
concerning our knowledge of the nature or essence of substance leads him to deny the specific 
Cartesian claim that thought constitutes the nature of immaterial substance. Locke’s view is not 
that immaterial substance cannot think; rather, his view is that - because we do not know the 
nature of any substance - we do not know that thinking constitutes the nature of immaterial 
substance. In an effort to overturn the Cartesian thesis that thinking constitutes the nature of 
immaterial substance, Locke argues that immaterial substances do not always think, and points to 
the case of sleep. As we saw above, Locke holds that we are always ‘sensible’ of thinking. As we 
                                                 
2 For more on this, and an overview of the scholarly debates on how to read Locke’s scepticism, see Uzgalis (2014). 
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are not sensible of thinking when asleep, this means that - assuming our souls remain whilst we 
sleep - our souls need not think (II.i.10). Locke claims that if our souls think whilst we are not 
aware of it, then during that period we are not the same person as our soul: ‘If the Soul doth 
think in a sleeping Man [then]… It is certain, that Socrates asleep, and Socrates awake, is not the 
same Person’ (II.i.11).  
Immediately following publication, Locke’s account of personal identity and immaterial 
substance became the subject of controversy. One of its early critics3 was Thomas Burnet, who 
anonymously published a pamphlet - Remarks Upon An Essay Concerning Human Understanding 
(1697a) - raising problems for many aspects of the Essay. We will focus on those concerning the 
thesis that immaterial substance need not think. 
Burnet worries that this thesis threatens the immortality of the soul. In the course of 
leading up to this great objection, Burnet raises three smaller worries. First, Burnet wonders how 
one can observe that one’s soul sometimes does not think; for when you do observe it, you think 
(Burnet, 1697a, 8). And, when we are asleep, we dream many ‘childish Thoughts’ in the ‘silent 
Night’ that we may not remember (Burnet, 1697a, 11). Second, Burnet does not understand how, 
if the soul is at any time utterly without thoughts, it begins to think again at the end of that 
unthinking interval (Burnet, 1697a, 9). Third, Burnet is ‘utterly at a loss’ how to frame ‘any idea 
of a dead Soul, or of a Spirit without Life or Thoughts’. He argues that a soul must have some 
properties to distinguish it from ‘Nothing’ and ‘Matter’; the implication is that, if a soul does not 
think, it cannot be so distinguished (Burnet, 1697a, 9).  
Burnet goes on to set forth his ‘great Concern’: if the soul is sometimes without 
thoughts, then there is no security that after the body’s death the soul will not be ‘thoughtless 
and senseless, and so without Life’ (Burnet, 1697a, 12). Burnet implies that the possibility of 
unthinking souls is incompatible with the immortality of the soul, writing that while Locke’s 
claim that human souls will enjoy an afterlife is ‘some comfort’, he does not know how Locke 
will explain it (Burnet, 1697a, 12). In the seventeenth century this is a great concern indeed, as it 
impugns Locke’s Christian belief in the immortal afterlife of the soul, effectively charging Locke 
with irreligion or atheism.    
In response to Burnet’s first pamphlet, Locke wrote a brief, brusque reply, barely 
touching on Burnet’s arguments. For example, Locke responds to Burnet’s worries concerning 
the immortality of the soul with a short statement of his belief in the ‘revelation’ of immortality 
                                                 
3 For more on the early critics of Locke’s account, see Ayers (1991, 254-277) and Thiel (2011, 97-221). 
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through the Gospel (Locke, 1823, 188). Burnet was deeply offended by Locke’s reply4 and 
published two further pamphlets - Second Remarks (1697b) and Third Remarks (1699) - expanding 
on his original criticisms. Locke did not reply to Burnet again. However, taking up Locke’s 
pennon, Cockburn replied to Burnet on Locke’s behalf.     
 
2.2 Cockburn’s defence of the thesis that immaterial substance need not think  
Cockburn’s Defence of Mr. Locke’s Essay of Human Understanding (1702) is a response to 
Burnet. The Defence was published anonymously; in correspondence, Cockburn explains that this 
was because a woman’s name ‘would give a prejudice’ against a work of this nature5. In the 
Preface, Cockburn expresses her admiration for Locke’s Essay, and explains that she will defend 
it against the charge that it contains ‘very dangerous’ principles (Cockburn, 1702, 37). Burnet 
remained anonymous at this time, and Cockburn refers to him as the ‘Remarker’.  
We will consider Cockburn’s defence of Locke’s thesis that immaterial substance need 
not think. This treatment builds on brief discussions in Jacqueline Broad (2002, 154-5) and 
Jessica Gordon-Roth (forthcoming)6. I will discuss Cockburn’s responses to Burnet’s minor 
worries in turn, and then move on to his major objection.   
Cockburn tackles Burnet’s first difficulty by arguing that, for Locke, it is a ‘contradiction’ 
to say that a man thinks but is not conscious of it, as thinking consists in being conscious of it 
(Cockburn, 1702, 54). Using Locke’s terminology, Cockburn restates Locke’s argument 
concerning the sleeping man: ‘He says indeed, that if the soul can, whilst the body is sleeping, having its 
thinking and enjoyments apart, which the man is not at all conscious of; his soul, when he sleeps, and the man 
consisting of body and soul, when he is waking, are two persons’ (Cockburn, 1702, 54). She 
complains that Burnet’s objection muddles the notions of soul, man, and person, and that - 
whilst Burnet may be using them to signify the same thing, and he can use the terms as he 
pleases - it is impossible to read Locke ‘with the least attention’ and not know that he uses the 
terms very differently (Cockburn, 1702, 55). ‘[U]nderstanding by person, as he does, self 
consciousness... wherever there are two distinct incommunicable consciousnesses, there are two distinct 
persons, though in the same substance’ (Cockburn, 1702, 55-6). If one accepts that a person is self 
consciousness, then if the sleeping man and the waking man have independent streams of 
                                                 
4 Indeed, Burnet’s indignation radiates off the pages: ‘I know no good Reason you [Locke] can have for writing in 
such a snappish and peevish way... you ought not to take your Revenge, or ease your Spleen upon an inoffensive 
Pen’ (Burnet, 1697b, 10). 
5 Letter reprinted in Cockburn (1992, II: 155). Cockburn was so successful at concealing her identity that, on 
publication, it was speculated that the Defence was authored by Locke.  
6 These scholars discuss many additional aspects of Cockburn’s response to Burnet, including particularly her views 
on Locke’s speculation that God could create thinking matter.  
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thought, they are two different persons. Against the charge7 that Cockburn has missed Locke’s 
distinction between man and person, this discussion shows that she is absolutely aware of it. The 
only way that Burnet can reply to Cockburn is by rejecting Locke’s account of personal identity 
altogether, a rejection that would require substantial further argument. 
Kathryn Ready has argued that Cockburn’s Lockean account of personal identity is 
connected to her feminism; I will briefly outline this connection. Conceptualising the self in 
terms of body or soul has historically contributed to women’s subordination, as women’s bodies 
and souls have been held inferior. Ready argues that Locke made it possible to conceptualise the 
self as a person, and that Locke’s ‘strikingly gender-neutral’ definition of a person implies that all 
persons have the same powers of reason. Ready speculates that Cockburn was aware of the 
feminist potential of Locke’s account8 and as such she had a ‘special stake’ in defending it 
(Ready, 2002, 563-570). Whilst Cockburn certainly holds feminist views9, it is difficult to confirm 
Ready’s speculation because Cockburn does not provide an extended discussion of feminism, 
and nor does she elaborate on the precise relationship between persons and souls (perhaps 
because of her Lockean epistemic modesty). 
To return to our main discussion, Cockburn draws on Lockean scepticism about 
substance to tackle Burnet’s second and third minor difficulties. In response to the former, 
Cockburn objects that the fact we do not understand how souls begin to think again after an 
unthinking interval does not mean that it cannot be done. She points out that there are many 
‘common and visible’ operations in nature that we do not understand - including how souls think 
at all, or pass from one thought to another, or recollect memories, or move bodies - and yet 
Burnet does not deny that these operations take place (Cockburn, 1702, 57). Cockburn is 
effectively pushing the burden of proof back onto Burnet. Either Burnet must explain how these 
operations in nature take place, an extremely difficult task; or, Burnet must explain why we 
accept some unexplained operations but not others.  
Cockburn responds to Burnet’s third difficulty - that of framing an idea of a spirit 
‘without Life or Thoughts’ - by retorting, ‘How a dead soul comes in here, I do not know’ 
(Cockburn, 1702, 60). As Cockburn points out, Burnet seems to assume that if a spirit does not 
think, then it is dead. Against this assumption, Cockburn argues that life and thought can come 
                                                 
7 Thiel (2011, 166) writes of Cockburn, ‘she holds (unlike Locke and yet attempting to defend Locke) that ‘man’ and 
‘person’ are synonymous terms’. In support, Thiel cites Cockburn’s statement, ‘For men and persons in common use, 
and scripture language, are synonymous terms’ (Cockburn, 1992, I: 307). Against Thiel, in this passage Cockburn is 
merely explaining that in common use ‘man’ and ‘person’ are synonymous; she is not advocating this view.  
8 It is controversial whether Locke himself was. See Ready (2002, 565-9), Hirschmann & McClure (2007) and Goldie 
(2007). 
9 For example, in correspondence, Cockburn argues that women ‘are as capable of penetrating into the grounds of 
things, and reasoning justly’ as men are; reprinted in Cockburn (2006, 227-8). On Cockburn’s feminism see Kelley 
(2002), Ready (2002) and Broad (2002, 145-50).  
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apart: insects and plants have life but do not think (Cockburn, 1702, 60). It is difficult to see how 
Burnet could deny this, without either attributing thought to insects or plants, or denying life to 
them; neither position is attractive. Having tackled this assumption, Cockburn goes on to hang 
Burnet on a dilemma.  
On the first horn, Cockburn argues that if the soul had no essential properties other than 
the power of thinking, then there can be no reason why matter may not have that power 
(Cockburn, 1702, 60-1). In other words, there would be no reason to restrict the power of 
thought to immaterial substance. As Burnet (1697a, 12-13) worries that the possibility of 
thinking matter leads to materialism and atheism, this position would be unacceptable to him. 
On the second horn, Cockburn argues, ‘If it be said she [the soul] has other essential properties, 
without which she could not have the power of thinking, when the Remarker has found out 
what those properties are, he will then know what the soul is’ (Cockburn, 1702, 61). If 
immaterial substance has other properties that uniquely grounds its power of thought, then it has 
other properties by which it can be distinguished from nothing or matter. On this horn, Burnet’s 
objection that the unthinking soul cannot be distinguished is dissolved. Cockburn concludes by 
remonstrating that we should not ‘make our knowledge the measure of things’: our not having 
an idea of a thing is not sufficient to exclude it from being (Cockburn, 1702, 62).  
Lastly, we arrive at Cockburn’s response to Burnet’s great concern. She opens her 
discussion by arguing that, even if the soul does always think, God could deprive it of being in 
the midst of its most ‘vigorous reflections’ (Cockburn, 1702, 53). Cockburn’s reasoning is as 
follows. A theorist who holds that immaterial substance always thinks - such as Descartes, who 
argues that thought constitutes the nature of the soul - would believe that, should a soul cease to 
think, it would cease to exist. However, this does not entail that thinking souls will (or have) 
always exist; the Cartesian conception of the soul is compatible with God’s power to create or 
destroy souls. With this defence of Locke in place, Cockburn goes on the offensive. 
Burnet is a ‘intellectualist’: he holds that God knows what is morally right, such that God 
does what he knows to be good. In contrast, ‘voluntarists’ hold that God wills what is morally 
right, such that what God does is good. As an intellectualist, Burnet believes that human beings 
have a natural conscience - an inward moral sense of what is right - that is akin (although 
inferior) to God’s. In the context of worrying that Locke is a voluntarist, Burnet writes that our 
natural conscience provides a ‘presage’ of ‘Rewards and Punishments’ (Burnet, 1699, 13). Burnet 
is arguing that our natural conscience gives us a presentiment of an afterlife, in which God will 
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reward or punish our actions in this life. As is well recognised in the scholarship10, Cockburn is 
also an intellectualist. Citing Burnet’s views on natural conscience, Cockburn argues that these 
‘proofs’ of the afterlife ‘remain in their full force’ notwithstanding the supposition that 
immaterial substance always thinks (Cockburn, 1702, 63). Essentially, Cockburn is arguing that 
we have independent reason to believe in the immortality of the soul, regardless of what (or, how 
little) we know of its nature. Short of retracting his beliefs concerning natural conscience - an 
implicitly untenable move - it is hard to see how Burnet could reply to this argument.  
Drawing in part on Locke’s account of personal identity and scepticism about substance, 
Cockburn has convincingly defended his thesis that immaterial substance need not think. On 
discovering that Cockburn authored the Defence, Locke wrote to her in late 1702, praising the 
‘strength and clearness’ of her reasoning and the way she ‘vanquished’ his adversary11. Although 
Cockburn’s advocacy of this thesis is not novel, I argue below that Cockburn applies this thesis 
in a novel way: to space. 
   
3 Cockburn on Space     
This section will set out Cockburn’s metaphysic of space, and then explain how it is 
grounded on her earlier views concerning immaterial substance. This discussion of Cockburn’s 
account of space extends the existing scholarship found in Broad (2002, 158-163) and my (2013).  
Cockburn’s discussion of space comprises the second of her “Cursory Thoughts”, 
prefixed to her Remarks Upon some Writers on Morality (1743). Cockburn sets herself against anti-
realism about space, specifically the positions expounded in Edmund Law’s Origin of Evil (1732) - 
an English translation of William King’s Latin De Origine Mali, containing extensive notes by Law 
- and Isaac Watts’ Philosophical Essays on Various Subjects (1733). Cockburn puts forward several 
arguments for realism about space. These include her empiricist claim that, like the idea of 
matter, the idea of space is early obtruded on the senses (Cockburn, 1743, 95). If one rejects the 
existence of space one must also reject the existence of matter, an implicitly unacceptable 
position (Cockburn, 1743, 95). Having argued that space is real, Cockburn sets out to determine 
its nature.  
Cockburn accepts the Great Chain of Being, a metaphysic on which every possible kind 
of being – including plants, animals, men, and spirits – is instantiated in a hierarchy, differing 
from each other by gradual degrees. Cockburn’s acceptance of the Great Chain provides 
                                                 
10 Cockburn’s moral views have attracted more scholarship than any other area of her philosophy. See Bolton 
(1993), Broad (2002, 148-9), Sheridan (2007), Nuovo (2011, 249-264), Myers (2012, 66-70), Sund (2013), and Duran 
(2013).  
11 Reprinted in Locke (1982, 730-1).  
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evidence of her Platonism, as the Chain is rooted in the Platonic ‘principle of plenitude’ on 
which anything that can exist, does exist12. For Cockburn, on this ‘scale of beings’ or ‘gradual 
progress in nature’, the most perfect example of an inferior species comes very near to the most 
imperfect example of the superior species above (Cockburn, 1743, 97). However, Cockburn 
argues that, as matters stand, our picture of the Great Chain is unfinished, for body and soul do 
not differ from each other by sufficiently gradual degrees. To fill this gap, Cockburn posits a 
further substance that partakes of the nature of both: ‘And why may not space be such a being... 
an immaterial unintelligent substance, the place of bodies, and of spirits, having some of the properties of both’ 
(Cockburn, 1743, 97). Space is posited as a third kind of substance, in addition to body and 
spirit: akin to matter, it is unintelligent; but, akin to spirit, it is immaterial.  
I previously argued that Cockburn’s account of space is important because it can be 
construed as a ‘new’ solution to theological difficulties troubling early modern realist accounts of 
space. In this context, I add an unexplained remark: Cockburn’s account is unusual because 
Cockburn draws on Locke’s thesis that souls need not think in a novel way13. This paper explains 
and greatly expands on that remark, arguing that there is a sense in which Cockburn’s 1702 views 
on the soul underlie her 1743 account of space. This connection becomes apparent when 
Cockburn considers an objection that Law and Watts might make to her account of her space.  
Referencing their work, Cockburn supposes that neither Law nor Watts would allow ‘an 
immaterial being, without the power of thinking’ (Cockburn, 1743, 100). This is of course correct, 
given that Law (1732, 3) states that the ‘substance of Spirit consists in the Powers of Thinking 
and acting’; and Watts (1733, 51-2) argues that spirit is a ‘Power of Cogitation or Thinking’. 
Cockburn engages with Watts’ position in some detail; before going any further we will examine 
it more closely. 
Against Locke’s view that we cannot know the nature of immaterial substance, Watts 
argues that it is the power of thought. Echoing Burnet, Watts argues that if the soul ceases to 
think, he has no idea of what remains: ‘as far as my Ideas reach, a Soul ceases to be, if It ceases 
to think’ (Watts, 1733, 117). Watts argues that language is one source of the mistaken view that 
thought is not the substance of soul. On a ‘Grammatical View’ the names of qualities frequently 
end in suffixes such as ‘ing’ or ‘ity’; this might give rise to the mistaken belief that ‘thinking’ is a 
quality supported by a substance, rather than a substance itself (Watts, 1733, 65-8). For Watts, 
the Lockean supposition that there is some ‘utterly unknown’ being called substance carries 
dangerous consequences. For example, if the substances comprising body and mind are so much 
unknown, for all we know they may be the same substance, a view that could lead to materialism 
                                                 
12 For more on Cockburn’s Platonism, see my (2013, 204-5). 
13 See my (2013, 206). 
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(Watts, 1733, 60-61). Watts acknowledges that, whilst he leaves Descartes’ account of matter ‘at 
the Foot’ of Newton, his views on the soul are Cartesian: ‘the two Worlds of Matter and Mind 
stand at an utter and extreme Distance... so the Weakness of the Cartesian Hypothesis of 
Bodies... does by no means draw with it the Ruin of his Doctrine of Spirits’ (Watts, 1733, v).  
 Cockburn tackles Watts’ views in several ways. Her response to his claim that if you 
remove the power of thought from a spirit we have no idea of what is left echoes her earlier 
response to Burnet: she replies that the fact we do not have an idea of what remains does not 
mean that nothing remains, as our ignorance would not hinder a substance from remaining if it 
were there (Cockburn, 1743, 100). As in her Defence, Cockburn states that our ignorance of a 
substance is not sufficient reason to exclude it from existence (Cockburn, 1743, 101).  
 Cockburn goes on to attack Watts’ claim that a power can be a substance, and his 
suggestion that his opponents have been misled by language: 
 
I do not find myself so prejudiced by logical or grammatical ways of speaking, but that I could 
easily agree with this author... that a power of thinking may be the substance of spirit: actions and 
abilities (and I have no other idea of powers) seem unavoidably to imply some subject of them 
(Cockburn, 1743, 101).  
 
Referencing her Defence, Cockburn explains that she has not found any new arguments to cause 
her to alter her previous sentiments, that from what we know of the human soul, thinking 
cannot be the substance of it (Cockburn, 1743, 101). Cockburn explains that the ‘lesson’ she 
learnt from Locke’s Essay is that, from our ignorance of the nature of things, no conclusions can 
be drawn except concerning the narrowness of our understandings. As such, Cockburn argues 
that we have no need to fear the ‘dangerous consequences’ apprehended by Watts: our ignorance 
of the natures of body and mind does not entail that they are the same substance (Cockburn, 
1743, 101).  
Against this potential line of objection from Law and Watts - or, indeed, from any other 
thinker holding a Cartesian view of immaterial substance - Cockburn argues that, because we do 
not know the nature of immaterial substance, we must leave open the possibility of unthinking 
immaterial substances. This possibility underlies her account of space, in the sense that the 
possibility of unthinking, immaterial substances is a necessary component of her account of 
space as an unthinking, immaterial substance.   
Speculatively, Cockburn’s views on unthinking immaterial substance may underlie her 
account of space in an additional sense, in that the former may have provided the inspiration for 
the latter. This speculation was prompted by reading Watts, who asks, ‘I would fain know 
10 
 
wherein does this Bulk or Substance of the [unthinking] Soul... differ from so much mere Space?’ 
(Watts, 1733, 118). Watts, of course, conceives space as nothing, and he is implying that an 
unthinking soul would also be nothing. However, for Cockburn, an unthinking soul is a 
‘something’. Perhaps Cockburn’s reflections on the bulk of an unthinking, immaterial soul 
provided the germ of her account of space.  
 
 4 Final Thoughts 
This paper has argued that Cockburn applies the Lockean thesis that immaterial 
substance need not think in a new way: to develop a novel account of space. Our discussion 
belies the claim that Cockburn is not a particularly acute or consistent thinker14. Further, this 
paper has demonstrated that seemingly disparate parts of Cockburn’s corpus - including not least 
her views on the soul and on space - are connected in surprising ways. This suggests the need for 
a substantial, holistic study of Cockburn, treating her various views as part of a larger 
philosophic system15.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
14 This charge is made by Leslie (1959-60, 639) and repeated in Kersey (1989, 12). Nuovo (2011, 248-9) provides a 
spirited rejection of Leslie’s charge. Nonetheless, Nuovo adds that, whilst Cockburn’s thoughts are original in the 
sense that they are her own, they are not novel in the sense that there is anything ‘altogether new’ in them. Against 
this, we have seen that that at least Cockburn’s account of space is original and novel.     
15 I would like to thank Jacqui Broad, Martin Lenz, Samuel Rickless, and an anonymous referee for this journal for 
making helping comments on earlier drafts of this paper.  
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